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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HANCE A. TAYLOR, and ERMA G.
TAYLOR, his wife, and PARLEY
P. TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs and .Appellants,
vs.
WEBER COUNTY, a municipal corporation, LYMAN HESS, ARTHUR
BROWN, ELMER CARVER, J.
PIERCE GRAHAM, ELLIS GRIFFIN
and GOLDEN NIELSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

CORRECTION OF APPELLANTS'
STATMEiNT OF FACTS
While appellant's statement of facts is accurate in
most particulars, it is incorrect in several matters which
are very material. We shall consider these briefly.
First, appellants in the first paragraph of their
Statement of Facts on page 2 give an incorrect statement as to how and why the drain was cleaned.
The evidence at the trial was that Weber County
had at all times, and particularly while the present respondents wer'e agents of the County, maintained that
Weber County had an absolute right to clean, drain
1
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through, and otherwise Inaintain the drain through
the Taylor property, as will be discussed in Respondnt's Statement of Facts.
Counsel give the impression that th'e purpose of cleaning the drain was
to drain an existing swamp and pond to the north of
the Taylor property. This is not correct. The purpose
was to clean out the drain so that water naturally flowing from the saucerlike area to the north of the appellants' property, and which had so flowed during the
lifetime of all the witnesses, could continue to flow and
not pond up along tile County road drains on Center
Street and make swamps on farms in th drainage area
(T. 128, 129).
Appellants' brief on page 2 indicates the water had
been backing against and over the newly constructed
highway, known as Center Street-and that it was to
protect this highway that the drain was built. This is
not correct. The old graveled road of Center Street,
according to testimony, had, of course, been there for
more years than anyone could remember. The new,
hard-surfaced highway was not constructed until the
summer of 1954, a year after the County cleaned the
drain (T. 128). Appellants attempt to show that there
had been some prior n'egotiation concerning the widening and deepning of the drain through the Taylor property before November 20, 1953. This gives an incorrect inference which will be discuss'ed near the last
of Point I of respondents' brief.
Second, appellants' brief on page 2 states that the
respondents cut the fence of Hance Taylor to get on
and clean the drain. Hance Taylor stated that the place
where the dragline came through his property was
2
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fenced with four wir'es and cedar posts (T. 20). He
admitted on cross-examination that he never saw the
fence on the north of his property where the dragline
was supposed to have come through when it was down;
that at all tim'es when he saw it during and after the
time the dragline was there, the fence was up ( T. 32).
Mr. Taylor acknowledged that the fence on the north
end of this property through which th dragline entered
his prop'erty was owned half by Lester and Merl
England, brothers, and half by himself ( T. 44, 45).
Lester England stated he was familiar with the place
where the dragline had gone from th England property
onto the Taylor property, and said there was no fence
standing th'ere at the time; that his nephew, while cleaning the ditch, set a brush fire and burned the fence out;
that the wire was lying flat on the ground, and that the
dragline went into the Taylor property where the fence
was laid down. (T. 200, 201)
Third, on page 4 of appellants' brief, last paragraph,
appellants mention the damage done to the property of
appellants by trespass of respondents and state that
the "results of cutting and washing away plaintiffs'
ground was not controverted by defendants". This, of
course, is not a correct statement, as will clearly be
shown in respondents' Statement of Facts by their
witnesses and by admission of appellants.
Fourth, the first paragraph on page 5 of appellants'
brief makes an incorrect statement of respondents' vi'ews
and of the drain history. These will also be correctly
set out in respondents' Statement of Facts.
Fifth, on page 6, appellants state that none of defendants' witnesses testified that they had gone onto the
3
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Taylor farms without seeking perm1sswn from the
Taylors to so do. This is, first, a misleading statement
because no one of defendants' witnesses ever testified
he had asked for permission to clean the drain, but
merely related the things that he did in cleaning it; and
it is, secondly, an incorrect statement as several of
defendants' witnsses made direct statements to the effect
that they had cleaned the drain without asking for permission from the Taylors.
These instances will be
clearly pointed out in respondents' Statement of Facts.
Sixth, on page 7, appellants state that a Weber
County Commissioner Randall in 1928 and a Commissioner McEntire in 1943 agreed to tile the drain through
the Taylor farm if the County were given permission
to enter the farms to cl'ean the drains. Appellants state
this was not denied by the defendants. This claim of
lack of denial leaves an erroneous impression of the
facts. Both Commissioners picked to have made thes'e
ditchbank agreements without any known record thereof
and without knowledge or concurrence of the other Commissioners, were Commissioners who were dead at the
time this law suit started and not available to make
denial.
Seventh, on page 7, appellants further speak of a
1948 meeting in the County Building with the County
Commissioners in which the County attempted to acquire a right-of-way through the Taylor farm. This
will be discussed at the last of Point No. I of respondents' brief.
Eighth, on page 8, appellants quote Commissioner
Carver as saying that when the drain was cleaned, the
Commission'ers were not acting under the direction of
4
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the farmers in the vicinity. This is not a correct interpretation of Mr. Carver's statement, as will be
pointed out in respondents' argument of Point IV of
their brief.
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS

Early Drain History
Appellants Hance A. and Erma G. Taylor, his wife,
from 1946 and up to and including the time of this
action, were the owners of a long, narrow strip of land
lying in Plain City in Weber County, Utah. The strip
was 3791;2 fe'et wide by 1,452 feet long, running in length
north and south Appellant Parley P. Taylor owned the
land adjoining the Hance Taylor property on the south,
his land being the same width but considerably shorter.
For as far back as any of the parties to the action could
remember, this narrow strip of land running between
the farm lands on the east and west had been a low
natural swale in which drainage water ran through the
bottom land (T. 183). As long as fifty-five years ago,
it was remembered as a meadow running from 'each
side of the property down towards this swale where
the water was running (T. 184). The channel now known
as the Taylor drain was originally the bottom of this
long, narrow swale. The drain hel'e in question starts
at approximately the Center Street road and drains the
drain along that road and then runs south between the
Baker and England property about 80 rods to the appellants' property, th'en through their property and a
considerable distance beyond to a creek known as Four
Mile. The drain, and particularly its head near Center
Street, is the center and low point of a tremendous
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natural valley lying west, north, and east of this swale
and containing in this drainage area between 1,200 and
2,000 acres of land ( T. 193, 194).
Commissioner Carver spoke of this saucerlike area
as one draining water from practically every direction
(T. 107). At trial, the testimony was undisputed that
this Taylor drain drained an area going east between
one-half and one mile to Farr West, and going west at
least a mile to the Robins on property on the Clearfield
Road (T. 40, 41, 42) and north of the Center Street
road onto the Christensen property (T. 193, 130,
131). The only deviations from these statements were
that appellants and their counsel throughout the trial
spoke of ponds and lakes up to the north of Center
Street which in times past drained through this area.
These were not remembered by witnesses for respondents except as to ponds built up near the Center Street
head of the drain when the drain became clogged :every
few years.
Mr. England, in describing the area of land that
this drain carried the water away from, stated that when
the drain becomes clogged with rushes and weeds, that
the water backs up in the drain north under the Center
Street road into Ted Christensen's pasture, and that
if the drain is not kept open, the water will gradually
fill up the whole pasture (T. 203). He stated that two
or three years before the trial, when the drain was not
properly cleaned, it backed up and caused a pond in
Christensen's pasture large enough to row a boat on.
It stayed there approximately six weeks (T. 207). He
stated that approximately twenty-five years ago, there
was a pond across Center Street at the head of the
6
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drain in Christensen's pasture, and that there was more
or less a perman·ent pond there when the drain became
full of reeds and weeds, but when they cleaned the drain,
no water stayed in there (T. 208, 209).
Lester England testified that he personally remembered the land when it was just a swale (T. 216). He
remembered the Taylor drain for a period of at least
fifty-five years (T. 183). At that tim·e, in the center of
the swale, there was approximately a three foot ditch
which they cleaned out with teams and scrapers (T. 217).
Mr. England further testified that thirty, forty, or fifty
years ago, the early owners of the Taylor land started
pulling and scraping dirt down from the sides of this
narrow strip of land and up to the sides of the ditch,
thereby cutting down the high sides of the land and
filling in the swampy, meadowy edges of the swale. This
action, along with the scraping out of the channel, made
a definite drain in the center of the swale where originally it had just been a natural bed. The leveling of the
surrounding high land down to the edges of the drain
made it so that the sides and the banks of the drain were
higher than normal. This was done so that the land
could be used right up to the edges of the drain as
cultivated farm land rather than just pasturage in the
rolling swale ( T. 183, 184, 185).
The appellant Hance Taylor testified that the reason
the channel was originally dug in the location where the
drain is now was because originally there was a small
swale going through there. He remembered seeing them
cut wild hay across there ( T. 312).
This action by the early owners prevented the entire
swale from being the natural course of drainage and
7
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channeled it instead into this one drain. l\Ir. England
further stated that the Etngland property which Iirs
north and east of the Taylor property and the Taylor
master drain, had drained into the drain along Center
Street and west into this master drain through the
Taylor farm for at least seventy-five years (T. 186).
Appellant Hance Taylor admitted that there was
an eight or ten inch tile drain running across his property from the west over to the main Taylor drain and
draining water from an open drain cmning from about
one mile west through the Lawrence Stander and
Robinson properties. He stated that he had never been
to the end of this open drain, so he didn't know just
how far it went. His estimate was that this tile drain
through his property was far enough underground so
that it came into the main Taylor drain approximately
six inches from the bottom (T. 40, 41, 42, 43). It was
testified that there is also a 4 inch tile drain buried under
the Hance Taylor farm and running from the west into
the Taylor drain (T. 109·, 110, 116, 117). No witnesses
at the trial, including appellant Hance Taylor, could
recollect when these two tile drains were placed under
the Taylor farm.
Mr. Lester England testified there is another drain
draining into the Taylor drain from the east just north
of the appellants' properties. He stated that this drain
came from approximately one mile east in a group of
sloughs in Farr West and ran down through a natural
swale almost to the present Taylor drain; that it then
went north to Center Street into the Center Street drain,
then west a very short distance through the Center
Street drain to a point where it joined the Taylor drain,
8 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and then ran south through the present Taylor drain.
He said that about the time of the great flu epidemic
in 1920, Ether Taylor, brother of appellant Parley
Taylor, filled up this natural drain so that the land
over it could be farmed. A Mr. Bell, whose property
was up by Ether Taylor's property, threatened to start
a law suit against Ether for filling up the drain. The
drain was then reopened by agreement of the parties,
allowing the water to flow naturally down toward the
Taylor drain, and Weber County at that time, with its.
dragline and at the request of the parties then involved,
cut the end of the drain through Wilford England's
property so that it ran directly west from Ether Taylor's
property into the Taylor master drain, where it now
runs, without going into it by way of the Center Street
drain (T. 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 and 314).

Taylor Drain History During the Last 35 Years
Mr. England testified that he had an early r'ecollection of the County using power equipment in the drain,
and that a man by the name of Louie Shummers, in approximately 1918 or 1920, drove the first dragline for
Weber County through this drain when Mr. Skeen's
father was Road Supervisor ( T. 191, 192).
Delwin Sharp, the Road Supervisor for Weber
County for the District of Plain City, stated that in approximately 1918, he went along the drain in question
for Weber County and dug out the drain to its approximate present width and depth. At that time, just north
of the appellant's property, he put in a cement and tile
culvert under the canal for the drain to run through
and while cleaning out the drain, he put in two other
concrete culverts, one on the Hance Taylor property
9
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and one on th'e Parley Taylor property (T. 226 to 229).
Weber County did this work, furnished the 1naterials,
and paid for all the labor. He stated that the two culverts which he placed in the appellants' property are
still there in the same position in the drains where he
placed them. He stated that the drain might be six
inches to twelve inches wider now than it was then. lllr.
Sharp made it clear that he cleaned the drain at that
time without obtaining permission from the Taylors.
He went on to say that the fellow who owned the ground
at the time, John H. Taylor, was there, and that he was
hired, along with Ether Taylor, to work for the County
in cleaning the drain.
Mr. Sharp added that he acted just on the County
Commissioners' instructions ( T. 231, 232).
Ernest Jensen testified that he cleaned the entire
Hance and Parley Taylor drain in approximately 1928
at the instruction of the County Commissioners; that at
that time, he saw Parley Taylor out near the drain, but
that he had no conversation with him (T. 240-241). He
stated that he cleaned the drain with a County dragline
from a levee near the south part of appellant Parley
Taylor's land north up through Parley's land and
through Hance Taylor's land up to Center Street. He
dropped the cleanings from the drain up on the bank
and left them there. He stated that he saw the culverts
put in by Delwin Sharp, that he cleaned the drain down
to a point level with the bottom of them so that the water
ran straight through, and that he cleaned out any
bumps which went above the level between the bottoms
of the culv·erts ( T. 236, 237, 238, & 212, 213).
Mr. Jesse Singleton stated that in 1933, he went up

10
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the ditch for Weber County with a shovel and pitchfork
and cleaned out the rubbish (T. 244, 245).
In 1935, the Weber County Mosquito Abatement
Project cleaned the drain again (T. 245, 246). At that
time, they put in some new pipes in the drain coming
from the west into the Taylor drain from the Stander
property where the pipes had apparently been broken
(T. 252, 253).
Mrs. Delilah Taylor U rry (prior owner of appellant
Hance Taylor's land) stated that the W. P. A. cleaned
the drain with approximately twenty-five men (T. 302).
Mrs. Urry, on direct examination, indicated that when
the W. P. A. cleaned the drain, "they came in and asked
us if they could go through" (T. 301). On cross-examination of Mrs. U rry concerning whether permission
was requested by the W. P. A. to clean the drain, it
became clear that the only permission requested was to
go through several of her gates down on the south end
of her property to get up to the drain (T. 302, 303).
Mr. Lester Elllgland testified that in approximately
1933, the P. W. A. (probably referring to the same group
as Mrs. Urry's W. P. A.) cleaned this drain, starting at
Four Mile Creek on the south, running all the way up
through the Taylor property, and up to and including
the England property (T. 192). At that time, they
sloped the banks in a semi-round condition, as shown
in plaintiff's Exhibit C photograph. They moved in
with approximately five hundred men and stationed
them six to eight feet apart with shovels, and made the
drain the same as it is today. He stated that the drain
is the same now as it was when the P. W. A. finished
11
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with it as to width and depth (T. 201, 202).
Mr. Jessie Singleton stated in approximately 1938
he went through the drain again, as Weber County's
Supervisor, and had the rushes cut out and hauled off.
He hired appellant Parley Taylor and his son to help
with this work. He showed his County time book (defendants Exhibit 5), where he had credited their time
for work on this job. They were paid for the work by
Weber County under his supervision (T. 247, 248, 249 &
259). Mr. Singleton stated that again in 1943, he took
the County dragline and cleaned part of the Hance
Taylor drain - a part just north of Parley Taylor's
which was clogged ( T. 251, 252, 254). He stated that
when he did this job, he did not ask permission from the
Taylors to do it (T. 255).
Commissioner Lyman Hess testified that in approximately 1944, which was possibly the last time
spoken of by Mr. Singleton, he, as Commissioner, had
the Taylor drain cleaned through all of appellant Hance
Taylor's property, but stated that it did not need cleaning down in Parley Taylor's farm because of the fall
(T. 261, 262). At that time, he cleaned down to the
bottom level of the drain that came into the Taylor
drain from the west ( T. 261, 262). He testified that he
went onto the drain without permission from anyone,
but discussed the spreading of the sediment with Emry
Taylor ( T. 264, 265, 267, 268).
The evidence introduced, including the statement
of appellant Hance Taylor (T. 56), was that by the fall
of 1953, this drain again had filled up with sediment,
rushes, and other brush far above the level of the bottom
of the culverts (placed there in 1918 by Delwin Sharp).

12
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The Commissioners had been advised by appellants that
they could not clean the drain this time unless they
agreed to tile it. The Center Street road near the head
of the drain on the north end had been flooded the year
before, and they had been repeatedly requested by Mr.
Lester England, owner of the property on the north of
the Taylor land, and by Mr. Christensen and Mr. Gibby,
who also own land on the north, to clean this drain
(T. 323, 324, 325, 204, 205, 206). Approximately ten
days before the drain was cleaned, the County Commissioners sent a letter to appellants' (plaintiffs' Exhibit B), advising them that they intended to exercise
their right-of-way and clean the drain. The respondents', on November 20, 1953, moved the dragline down
the drain and along their bank right-of-way and cleaned
the drain.
No Damage in Drain Cleaning
At trial, the respondents elected to try the case
solely on the question of whether or not respondents
have a right to clean the drain and whether or not they
exceeded that right. It was clearly shown at trial by
testimony of both appellants and respondents that no
actual damage had been done by the respondents In
cleaning the drain.
Commissioner Carver stated that the drain was
approximately the same now as it was in 1920 (T. 131,
132).
Mr. England stated that twenty-five years ago,
the drain was the same as now, except that theW. P. A.
sloped the banks (T. 210, 211, 214).
Mr. Sharp stated that in 1918, he widened and deep-

13
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ened the drain into approximately its present position
(T. 228).
Commissioner Hess stated the drain was no bigger
after cleaning it in 1953 than it was after he had cleaned
it in 1944 (T. 262).
Appellant Hance Taylor, after testifying to the
severe damage done to his property by the cleaning of
the drain, on cross-examination repeatedly testified that
after the drain was cleaned, it was not necessarily too
much wider, it just went deeper. He further testified
that it caved in some years ago (T. 21, 23, 24).
Commissioner Carver stated that after the drain
was cleaned, he talked to appellant Hance Taylor about
it and Hance said that the damage hadn't been done now,
but wait until the water runs through (T. 322).
Lester England testified that he had gone over
the drain just before the trial and he couldn't see any
place where the drain had sluffed in from the sides
(T. 198, 220).
Mr. E. Paul Gilgen, Weber County Surveyor, testified that he made a complete survey of the drain just
before the trial and that he had taken cross-sections
every one hundred feet down the drain to show the crosssectional picture of the drain banks and the drain
bottom (T. 140).
He stated that the average depth of the Taylor
drain was four feet. He presented a graph (defendants'
Exhibit 4) showing a profile of the drain. The green
average line on this map was the average elevation of
the east and west banks (T. 148). The red line below
the green line represented an imaginary straight line

14
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drawn between the inside bottoms of the pre-existing
culverts in the drain. Mr. Gilgen called it the flow line
of the pipes and culverts as they sat in the drain (T. 150,
153). Mr. Gilgen described the first of these culverts
as lying approximately 100 feet south from Hance
Taylor's north property line fence, the second one as
being near the south end of the Hance Taylor property,
and the third one being on the Parley Taylor property.
He stated that all of these pipes were in the bottom of
the drain as shown on defendants' Exhibit 4 (T. 152).
These culverts used by Mr. Gilgen in determining the
flow line of the drain were the same ones pointed out
by Mr. Delwin Sharp as the ones placed in the drain by
him in 1918 for Weber County and which he described
as being in the same position now that they were in at
the time he placed them there ( T. 226, 228).
The two culverts on the Hance Taylor property
were located in the bottom of this four foot drain with
dirt piled above them to the level of the land. Mr.
Hance Taylor stated that over the top ?f the south
culvert on his property the dirt was piled up two feet
deep to make it level across there for a private road
(T. 35, 36, 38). He stated that above the north culvert
there would be about three feet of dirt (T. 40). He
clearly established that these were permanently established culverts and ones not apt tto shift or sink. Mr.
England corroborates Mr. Gilgen's statements concerning flow lin~s in his testimony on pages 202, 203.
Mr. Gilgen then testified that the black horizontal
line on defendants' Exhibit 4 represented the actual
elevation line of the bottom of the drain at the time he
made his survey (T. 153, 154). His survey, as shown
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on defendants' Exhibit 4, showed that the drain was
cleaned out generally just down to the natural flow line
of the drain as it was finally dug in 1918. ~Ir. Gilgen
stated there was a small section just south of the north
corrugated metal pipe on the Hance Taylor property
where the drain at the time of his survey was slightly
below the red line. At this point, the actual drain
bottom was approximately one inch below the red average flow line between the culverts.
The only other place on either of the appellants'
land where the drain, as surveyed by Mr. Gilgen, was
lower than the average flow line drawn between the
prior existing pipes and culverts, was down on appellant
Parley Taylor's property, just before the drain enters
the tweny-four inch tile and corrugated metal pipe,
(the point being described as fifteen to twenty-five feet
north of station 37, plus 13, shown on defendants' Exhibit 4). At the head of this culvert for a very short
distance, as shown on Exhibit 4, the drain was approximately three inches below the average flow line (T. 159).
In all other places along the drain, it was not cleaned
down below what Engineer Gilgen computed to be the
prior existing average flow line.
l\ir. Gilgen's survey further showed that the actual
present bottom of the drain was between one and two
inches below the visible bottom of the eight inch drain
running into the Taylor drain from the west (T. 156,
157), and that the actual bottom of the drain at this
point where the eight inch pipe entered it was still, after
having been dredged out by respondents, four to five
inches above the natural flow line of the drain (T. 160).
The jury was taken out to and allowed to view the drain.
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STATE~MENT

OF POINTS
The respondents will answer and argue the five
points posed by appellants in the order set forth and
argued in appellants' brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court
Erred in its Refusal to Grant Plaintiffs' Motion
for a Directed Verdict as to Liability at the Close
of all the Eividence.
Respondents' answer to this contention is that the
trial court properly refused to grant plaintiffs' motion
for directed verdict as to liability. Plaintiffs' case was
based solely on the question of trespass to real property.
The evidence of the appellants did not, as appellants'
counsel suggest, conclusively show that they were the
owners and in possession of that portion of the land
known as the Taylor drain. Respondents' evidence received from witnesses for respondents and by admissions
of appellants, disproved this claimed ownership and
possession of the drain. Respondents' evidence established three controverting facts:
(a) The drain in question was originally the
natural course of drainage for the saucerlike area surrounding the point of origin of the drain near Center
Street, and the natural drainage, although channeled by
early land owners, members of the community and
Weber County, has been actually maintained in the same
location as a course of drainage by the people of the
community and Weber County for a period of at least
75 years.
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(b) Weber County has by open, notorious, hostile,
adverse use and possession, with the knowledge of the
appellant landowners and under claim of right, maintained a right-of-way through the property of appellants to clean thrs master drain when needed and to allow
water from other parts of the county within the natural
drainage area to run through the drain.
(c) Two original owners of land lying immediately north of appellants' land paid appellants' predecessor in interest, John Taylor, for the right to have
their drainage water run down this channel and to
maintain the channel so that it might properly do so.
This right continued down to the time the drain was
clean'ed by respondents. Respondents, in cleaning the
drain, did so at the express request and instruction
and under the authorization of the successors in interest
of these landowners who purchased this right.
In denying plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict,
the trial court was guided, and properly so, by the
general law and the law of the State of Utah.
The
writer in 53 American Juris prudence, Trials, Sec. 332,
discusses the general law:
" . . . if there is conflict in the evidence, particularly when the evidence consists of oral testimony, if different inferences may reasonably be
drawn from the evidence or if the court would be
called to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses
or their testimony, the court should not and ordinarily will not direct a verdict."
This court discusses the Utah law in A. W. Sewell
Company v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company,
15 P. (2nd) 327, 80 Ut. 378:
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"The rule is well established in this state by a
long list of authorities that where there is any
substantial evidence upon which the jury could
find for the plaintiff under the pleadings, the
trial court must submit the issues to the jury and
cannot direct a verdict . . . . . In determining
this question, the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff."
This statement of law was in a case where the
defendant made the motion for a directed verdict, but
applying it to plaintiffs' motion, it clearly shows that
the motion should have been denied.
The evidence
establishing respondents' right-of-way and right to clean
the drain in question without being liable in trespass
is as set out at length in respondents' Statement of Facts.
It appears clear from the testimony that the Taylor
drain was the natural drain as described in respondents' pretrial statement for the saucerlike area north
of and surrounding the drain's point of origin near the
Center Street road. The appellants' misinterpret the
evidence on page 10 of their brief where they say that
the natural drainage for the head of the Taylor drain
was to the north. It is obvious from Mr. England's
answer that he is referring to another drain (T. 195).
In all of Mr. England's testimony, he makes it clear
that the drainage from his place and all around him
was and is to the south through the Taylor drain (T.
203 204, 207, 208, 209, 186). His testimony on
page 195, referred to by appellants on page 10, is
slightly disconnected, but was clearly not intended by
Mr. England to convey the idea that the natural drainage from the head of the Taylor drain was north.
In ruling that appellants were not entitled to a
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directed verdict, the court had before it respondents'
evidence that Weber County had a right-of-way acquired by prescriptive use of the drain for a period of
more than twenty years. The evidence clearly negatived the idea that this was a private drain. Appellants
cite the cases of Bertolina vs. Frates, 89 Ut. 238, 57 P.
(2d) 346; Jensen vs. Gerrard, 85 Ut. 481, 39 P. (2d) 1070;
and Buckley vs. Cox, 274 P. (2d) 277 (Ut. 1952), a~
setting out the elements necessary for acquiring a rightof-way by prescriptive use. Respondents have no question but what these cases set out the law of Utah on
this point.
The evidence submitted by respondents at trial and
admitted by witnesses for appellants clearly meets every
burden of proof and all of the tests set forth by the
Utah Supreme Court for establishing a right-of-way by
prescriptive use. From the facts more fully stated before, it is clear that Weber County for more than thirty
years has been cleaning and maintaining this drain,
placing new culverts and pipes in it at its own expense
and discretion. All of the work for more than thirty
years was done openly, notoriously, and adversely to
appellants. That it was done by Weber County under
claim of right cannot be doubted. The fact that on two
different occasions the early owners, and in fact appellant Parley Taylor hims·elf, worked under County
supervision, direction and control and for its money in
cleaning this drain, clearly establishes that Weber
County's claim of right was open and adverse. This
unrefuted testimony is clearly irreconcilable with any
theory holding that the Taylor drain was merely a
private drain used by and kept open by the appellants.
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It clearly discounts any claim that Weber County only
cleaned the drain upon appellants' conditional permission.

These regular cleanings, channelings, and acts of
dominion over the drain over a period of more than
thirty years prior to the entry here in question show an
open, continuous and uninterrupted use by Weber
County for more than the required prescriptive period,
and clearly took away from the trial judge any right
to determine as a matter or law that Weber County did
not have and had not established a prescriptive rightof-way over the Taylor drain. The evidence in this
regard was clear, satisfactory and convincing that a
right-of-way has 'existed and has been maintained and
now exists.
Appellants' brief at page 10 attributes to respondents the claim that the County acquired a right-of-way
through the general use of the drain by the people of
the community for a period of years. This, of course,
was not respondents' contention at trial, nor is it now.
Appellants confuse the issues and the evidences presented at trial by what they label defendants' "Second
Theory". Respondents had three theories at trial upon
which evidence was presented: One was a right-of-way
over the drain obtained by prescription; second was the
sovereign right of the state and county governments to
clean and allow water to run through a natural waterway or course; and third, a right to clean the drain as
agent of Lester England and the other landowners whose
predecessors purchased this right. The general use of
the drain by those in the natural drainage area was
properly admitted to show a continuation of the
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original natural drainage.
On page 11 of their brief, appellants quote a portion
of Commissioner Carver's testin1ony which they claim
is an admission that the County in no way acted as the
agent of someone ~else in cleaning the drain. The testimony was correctly quoted, but it evidences a danger so
often encountered when statements are taken out of
context. Mr. Carver was not stating that Weber County
was not in any way acting for Mr. England in cleaning
the drain-he was just stating that primarily he was
acting for the County, as will be later discussed under
Point No. IV.
Appellants' statement on page 12 of their brief that
the "evidence, when read in conjunction with cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, conclusively shows
that on each and every occasion when defendants entered
the Taylor farm for the purpose of cleaning the drain,
permission was sought and obtained or the entry was
made without plaintiffs' knowledge" is, of course, not
a correct statement of the facts, nor a proper analysis
of the testimony, as shown by the transcript and the
facts before set out.
Counsel for appellants repeatedly attempted to
establish that there had been some meeting between appellants and respondents in the City & County Building
where the question of tiling the drain was discussed. On
page 270 of their cross-examination, appellants attempted to get Commissioner Hess to admit that he was
present at a meeting, apparently with the Taylors. concerning this drain, at the courthouse in Ogden in the
year 1948, at which meeting Commissioner Brown and
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Commissioner Stratford were supposed to have been
present. Commissioner Hess' answer was that Commissioner Brown was not a Commission'er at that time
and Commissioner Stratford had been dead for ten
years, and, further, he recalled no such meeting when
the matter of the drain across Parley Taylor's property
was considered. Further ( T. 270, 271), Commissioner
Hess stated he had searched the records and that there
was no record of such a meeting.
Respondents admitted that after 1949, there wer'e
several attempts by the County Commissioners, individually and collectively, to meet with the Taylors and
determine what their problem was concerning the drain,
but at no time did any of the commissioners present in
court admit that there had been any type of agreement
with the Taylors to tile their drain, nor had permission
to clean the drain been requested by these Commissioners, nor had any permission been granted conditional
upon Weber County tiling the drain, as far as any of
these Commissioners knew (T. 272, 273).
On cross-examination by Mr. Christensen, Commissioner Hess refuted the suggestion that in 1949 the
County had asked the Taylors for permission to clean
the drain (T. 277, 278).
Appellant Parley Taylor, in attempting to show an
instance where the County had asked for consent to
clean the drain, stated that in about 1943, he had a conversation out on the drain with a Commissioner
McEntire (deceased at time of trial) (T. 288). He stated
that his brother John was there to discuss the matter
with the Commissioner. After gentl'e leading by his
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counsel, he recalled that his brother John died in 1929
(T. 289).
Parley Taylor stated that the County Commissioners as a body in their legally constituted meeting never
contracted with him or agreed to tile his drain (T. 297).
It is clear that the evidence of appellants satisfies
in all particulars the requirements of the law and that
the motion for a directed verdict was properly denied.
POINT NO. II
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court
Erred in its Instruction No. 3, which Quotes
Verbatim from the Defendants' Pretrial Statement as to Theories of Defense Which are not
Substantiated by any of the Evidence in the Case
Respondents' answer to this contention of appellants
is that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in its Instruction No. 3.
The theories of the defense instructed upon in this
instruction were fully and properly substantiated by
the evidenc'e. Error is claimed here because the trial
judge in part of one instruction quoted from a written
statement made by the defendants upon court order
after the pretrial hearing for the purpose of setting forth
concisely what defendants' case would be at trial. No
statement was made in the pretrial statement upon
which evidenc'e was not then later introduced at trial.
In summarizing plaintiffs' case, the trial court, al~·
though not quoting at all times verbatim from plaintiffs'
pleadings and pretrial statements, still give an instruction in setting out plaintiffs' claims which was more
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generous to plaintiffs than their own evidence actually
was. The trial court, although using a portion of defendants' pretrial statement, still followed the rule laid
down in Bruner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. (2d)
649, by clearly defining the particular issues in the case
and by specifically stating to the jury the material facts
alleged, denied and admitted, and by clearly instructing
the jury that its Instruction No. 2 was the position of
the plaintiff and that Instruction No. 3 set out only the
answer to that complaint by defendants.
The appellants, on page 14 of their brief, state that
the instruction recites four theories which tlle defendants had proposed, "any one of which they felt would
justify a finding of the acquisition of a right-of-way".
This quoted statement was clearly not the statement of
the court in its instructions, but is one formulated by
tire appellants. It was not at any time during the trial
the contention of the respondents.
The points set out in the judge's Instruction No. 3
and in defendants' pretrial information, although numbering from 1 to 4, set out only three theories of defens·e,
not four, as appellants suggest. The first one is that
the drain was originally the natural course of drainage
for the saucerlike area around its point of origin and
that it has continually been maintained as the natural
drainage by the interested people in that area.
The second theory was that Lester England's father
and another early landowner, 0. J. Swenson, purchased
from John Taylor, an original owner of app'ellants'
property, the right to run their water through and to
maintain the drain. This payment very possibly was
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like the early payments of the United States to the Tripolian pirates to allow the United States to run their
shipping through the Mediterranean Sea without being
continually harassed, but however this money may have
originally been paid, the rights either obtained or shored
up were passed on down to the present landowners, including Lester England. Any right obtained_by Weber
County to clean the drain in N ovemb'er of 1953 at the
request of Lester England would be as an agent or a
servant of Lester England. No right-of-way at any
time was claimed by respondents from this purchase
for themselves.
The portion of the pretrial statement quoted by the
court in its instruction "that the people of the community" had maintained the drain for thirty-five to
forty years was, of course, a fact clearly borne out by
the respondents' evidence. The only correction should
have been that it had been for a period of from thirtyfive to seventy-five years. This allegation would be
material, as it clearly tends to show that appellants were
not the owners and in possession of the actual drain
running through their property and that said drain was
not merely a private drain constructed by appellants
for their own benefit, but was, rather, a natural public
drain in which many people, including Weber County,
held an interest.
The argument of appellants at page 14 of their
brief that paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 3 was supported by hearsay evidence only will be answered under
Point No. V of this brief and will not be further commented upon here.
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Appellants' comment on page 15 of their brief that
such evidence "if admissible, would not create a rightof-way in Weber County absent a grant from 0. G.
Swenson and Lester England's father or their successors
in interest to Weber County" is, of course, admitted,
as it has n'ever been the intention of respodents to claim
a right-of-way by reason of the purchase of right-of-way
by those early landowners. This argument by appellants raises a point not maintained by respondents.
Appellants' statement of Utah law in their citations
from Bruner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399; Farmers and
Merchants Savings Bank vs. Jensen, 64 Utah 609; Davis
vs. Hiener, 54 Utah 428; Hines vs. Gale, 25 Ariz. 65;
and Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Company, 99 Utah
307, all cited in Bruner vs. McCarthy, properly set forth
the law as quoted in those cases. Appellants have not,
however, properly applied the law in those cases to the
facts at hand. The case of Bruner vs. McCarthy, et al, in
105 Utah 399, 142 P. (2d) 649, summarizes the established Utah law on the question of the trial court reading from the pleadings, adds tllereto a general rule on
the matter to which the Utah court apparently subscribes, and discusses also an Arizona ruling to which
this court would subscribe. A digest of the majority
opinion of this court in that case would be as follows:
(1) It may be misleading, prejudicial and a reversible error for a trial court to merely read a verbatim
statement of the complaint, answer and reply in lieu of
giving a concise statement of the issues in the case to
the jury.
(2) It may be reversible error for a trial court to
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read a long, involved pleading to the jury where there
is no evidence to support some of the allegations made
in the pleadings.
(3) It may be a prejudicial error to read parts of
pleadings relating to issues upon which no evidence has
been introduced (Arizona law, possibly dicta here).
( 4) It is better proctice, and the court should its'elf
make a plain and concise statement in its own language
of the issues to be determined by the jury, and should
specifically state to them the material facts alleged,
denied and admitted in respect to all of such issues, and
the court should carefully omit any and all issues that
may have been eliminated by the parties themselves or
the court during or before the trial.
( 5) While most jurisdictions frown on the practice
of using the language of the various pleadings to summarize the issues for the jury, the rule that reading the
pleadings may or may not be error seems to meet with
general approval.
(6) Prejudice will not be presumed on appeal simply
from a showing that the trial court failed to construe
the pleadings and to charge the jury upon the issues. It
does not necessarily follow that the losing party has
been prejudiced simply because the trial court copied
in his instructions and read to the jury the pleadings
in the case instead of a statement of the issues in the
language of the court.
( 7) The burden rests on the complaining party to
go further and point out to the court wherein and in
what respect he has been prejudiced by the court's failure to define the issues and state to the jury the material
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facts alleged, denied and admitted in the court's own
words.
The trial court in the case at hand neither ignored
nor violated any of the rules of law summarized in the
Brunner vs. McCarthy case. In this case, the trial
court did not quote verbatim the entire complaint,
answer or reply in giving its instruction to the jury, as
was objectionable in Farmers and Merchants Savings
Bank vs. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084, nor did the
court read a long and involved pleading to the jury
when there was no evidence to support some of the
allegations made in the pleadings, as was objectionable
in Shield vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307,
105 P. (2d) 347. In quoting from respondents' pretrial
statement, the court was not attempting to make a
statement of all the issues in the case, but was only
covering certain of defendants' claims, and in fact went
on, in the court's own words, to further instruct on
other of defendants' claims after having, in its own
words, stated the grounds upon which plaintiffs were
basing their case, and by so doing removed this instruction from the objections set out in the Davis vs. Hiener
case, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 587. The trial court in fact
did make a plain and concis'e statement in its own language of practically all of the issues to be determined
by the jury, carefully admitting any and all issues that
were eliminated by the parties themselves or by th'e court
during the trial. Its incorporation in one part of Instruction No. 3 of a part of defendants' pretrial statement would not be prejudicial error. Appellants nowhere in their brief have pointed out in what respect
they have been prejudiced, as is required under the
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Bruner vs. 1\fcCarthy case above cited. This problem
is discussed in 5 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 1763, at
page 1113, where it states that "copying the pleadings,
or reading them to the jury for the issues it not reversible error in the absence of prejudice".
The only suggestion of error given by appellants
is on page 16 of their brief, where they interpret the
court's Instruction No. 3 as setting forth four possible
theories upon which the jury could find an acquisition
of right-of-way by Web'er County over the Taylors'
farm. Instruction No. 3, of course, did not do this. It
merely sets out the points and reasons for which the
defendant allege and claim that Weber County lawfully
cleaned the drain. The reading of a portion of a pretrial statement of this nature as part of an instruction
should not be as subject to danger as the reading of the
complaint, as appellants' suggest in their brief. The
reason is that at this stage of the proceedings, all of
the chaff should have been taken out of the matter.
Counsel, at the court's instruction, should only have
presented those things to the court by way of a pretrial
statement that it was known could and would be supported at trial.
Justice Wolfe's statement made in Bruner vs.
McCarthy, quoted in the center of page 15 of appellants'
brief, aptly summarizes the argument on this point under
the facts of this case and it need not be again set out
here.
POINT NO. III
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court
Erred in His Instruction No. 6, Setting Forth
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"Basic Principles of Drainage Law"
In Instruction No. 6, the court stated the Utah law
with respect to acquisition of a prescriptive right-of-way.
In Bertolina, et al, vs. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. (2d.)
346, at page 348 of the Pacific Reporter, the court stated:
"Where a person claims to have acquired an
easement by prescription over another's land, he
must show that he has acquired it by his own
continuous, open, uninterrupted, and adverse
user under claim of right for the twenty year
prescriptive period. The prescriptive right is
based originally upon the theory of a grant implied from long use."
See also Funk vs. Anderson, et al, 22 Utah 238, 61
P. 1006. At page 1006 of Pacific Reporter, the court
said:
"This period unless other provision was made in
the local statutes of the state in which the questions have arisen has been assumed to be twenty
years. So that now an enjoyment of an easement
for the term of twenty years raises a legal pr·esumption that the right was originally acquired
by title .... the presumption of a grant is the
foundation of the doctrine of prescription, and
is, in effect, the same, whether it arises because of
an adverse user for a period of twenty years or,
by analogy because of such user for the period
prescribed by the statute of limitations."
In Instruction No. 6, the court does set out the
element of adverse use, and we quote from that portion
of the instruction which sets it out:
"2B. That the user of the right affecting the
lands involved has made this use under a claim of
right as against the owner of the land as con-
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trasted with a temporary permission of the
owner."
In addition, the other elements n'ecessary to obtain a
right-of-way by prescription were set out by the court
in this instruction.
In Instruction No. 9, the court stated that defendants claimed that Weber County acquired a right-ofway for the drain across the property of plaintiffs and
that this right-of-way was acquired as a result of adverse use of the drain under a claim of right hostile to
plaintiffs; it further stated that if Weber County used
the drain with perinission or consent of plaintiffs, that
Weber County could not acquire a right-of-way under
such use; and further, that if the drain was used by
Weber County without a claim or assertion of right to
use the drain, that the use of the drain by W eb'er County
would not be adverse and Weber County could not acquire right-of-way under such use. This instruction
merely elaborated on item 2B set out in the court's Instruction No. 6 and was not in conflict therewith.
The case of Smith vs. North Canyon Water Company, 16 Utah 194, 52 P. 283, cited by appellants, is not
in point inasmuch as the court in that case discussed
the elements n:ecessary to appropriate water by adverse
possession under a particular statute then in force in
Utah (Section 2783, Compiled Laws of Utah 1888) and
did not discuss the elements necessary to gain a rightof-way by prescription.
Appellants' Point No. III is not well taken, as the
court's Instruction No. 6 is a correct statement of law
and was fully supported by the evidence, as shown by
the transcript and as before set out.
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POINT NO. IV.
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court
Er:rred in Its Instruction No. 13, There Being No
Evidenee at all in the Record to Support The
Instruction
Respondents' answer to this contention is two-fold.
First, it is submitted that there was evidence introduced at trial and in the record to the effect that
Weber County and respondents were in part acting as
agents or servants for Lester England, who had a rightof-way for drainage and maintenance of the drain in
question when they in fact cleaned the drain in N ovember of 1953. The following testimony, brought out at
the trial, was sufficient so that it could not be ignored
by the trial court and could have properly been considered by the jury.
Mr. Lester England testified that he owned the farm
land lying north of appellant Hance Taylor's land and
running up to Center Street, abutting on the drain in
question (T. 174, 175), and that the property had originally been his father's.
His land had been drained
through the Taylor drain for a period of over seventyfive years (T. 186). His father and a Mr. 0. J. Swenson
had purchased the rights from Grandad John A. Taylor,
a prior owner of appellants' land, to drain the water
from their lands through the Taylor drain (T. 187, 188,
189, 190, 191). Shortly before November of 1953, Mr.
England requested and authorized the County Commissioners and Weber County to clean the drain for
him so that his water might run through (T. 204, 205 ).
Mr. England stated that the ones he told to clean the
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drain were the County road men, Co1n1nissioner Elmer
Carver, and the man Griffin who drove the County
draglin'e (T. 205 ). That respondents were authorized
to clean the drain by and for l\lr. England was made
clear when Mr. Christensen cross-examined him as to
a conversation that he had with Com1nissioner Carver
(T. 224).
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF :M:R. ErNGLAND
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:
"A: I said, 'Go ahead and clean it out'.
"Q: And he said he would~
"A: Witness nodded his head.
"Q: So you at that time gave him p6-rmission
to clean your drain, didn't you~
"A: Yes.
"Q: Well, that was just before they went on
the Taylor property, wasn't it 1 Just a few days
before'
"A: I think it was. They done some other
work."
On page 11 of appellants' brief and again on page
20 under this point, it is stated that Commissioner
Carver testified that the County did not act as agent
for L'ester England in cleaning the drain. On page 11
of appellants' brief, a part of Mr. Christensen's crossexamination is set out to prove that Weber County was
not acting in any way as agent for anyone else in cleaning the drain. If the preceding testimony of Commissioner Carver is added to that quoted by appellants,
it corrcetly sets out what Commissioner Carver said.
34 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN:
"Q : Now, you mentioned some of these landowners around there had b'een asking you to
clean that drain. Were you cleaning the drain
for those landowners 7
"A: No, not primarily. The thing that
brought it to a head, as I told you in my testimony
the other day, is when Center Street road, which
is a F'ederal project ... " (Here Mr. Carver was
cut off by Mr. Christensen) (T. 323)
and if added to this is the
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MR. CARVER
BY MR. RICHARDS:

"Q: Had you or had you not been instructed
or ordered by other people up north of the Taylor
land to clean the drain prior to the time you
cleaned it7
"A: Yes.
"Q: Who had ordered you to do that
"A: Mr. England, Mr. Christens'en, Mr.
Gibby .... " (T. 324)
it then becomes cl'ear that what Commissioner Carver
was saying was that he had been instructed to clean
the drain by Mr. England and others; that these instructions prompted part of the County's action but not
all of it; that the Commissioners still checked the drain
and determined that it did need cleaning, and when
they cleaned it, it was primarily for Weber County, but
at least partially because of the promptings of :Mr.
England and others.
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Although the support for the court's Instruction No.
13 in the evidence may have been limited, it is not
correct, as appellants state, that there is no evidence at
all in the record to support it. Further, to say that
Weber County 'expressly denied at trial that it was
acting for anyone other than Weber County in cleaning
the Taylor drain is not a correct statement of Commissioner Carver's testimony.

Appellants' quotation on the law of instructions
from the case of State Bank of Beaver County vs.
Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612, is a good statement of law but is not controlling in this case as appellants have attempted to apply it. It in fact substantiat~s the contention of r'espondents, as it states at
page 432 of the Utah reports :
"It is necessary, however, that whatever theories
are presented by pleadings or otherwise, in order
to be entitled to b'e submitted by way of instructions to the jury, some evidence must have been
received by the court in support of such theory."
(Italics ours)
Had it proved necessary that the case be determined
on the question of whether the defendants acted only
through a righ,t-of-way owned by Lester England, then
there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make
a determination as to wheth'er 1Ir. England had such a
right-of-way and whether the County when they went
upon the drain acted upon the instruction of Mr. England
and as his servant or agent. The case of Jensen vs.
Gerrard, et al, 39 P. (2d) 1070, 85 Utah 481, supports Lester England's theory of right-of-way through
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the Taylor drain by asserting that an ineffectual parole
grant may ripen into an easement by prescription. To
do so, of course, it would require the advers e use and
enjoyment under claim of right, uninterrupted and continuous for twenty years. Mr. England's uncontroverted
testimony established that these requisites had bleen met
regarding his right-of-way.
1

Second, for the second division of our argument,
let us assume, as have counsel for appellants, that there
is no evidence in the record to support Instruction No.
13. Then, whether or not the giving of this instruction by the trial court was reversible error must be determined under the Utah law by the further question
of wh'ether or not it was prejudicial to appellants.
The case of Pulsipher vs. Chinn (Schmutz, Intervenor), 255 P. 439, 69 Utah 401, held that although an
instruction is shown to be clearly erroneous, it must
still be shown to have been prejudicial before it will be
considered as reversible error.
In the case of Clawson vs. Walgreen Drug Company,
et al, 162P. (2d) 759, 108 Utah 577, from which appellants
have quoted at length from the concurring opinion of
Justice Wolfe, it is interesting to note that in the case
itself, thle trial court gave two erroneous instructions,
neither of which, according to this court, was supported
by evidence in the case. In this case, two interesting
determinations were made concerning these instructions.
Th'e first was that this court may look at the overall
case and if it determines that the possibility was very
remote that the jury took into consideration the fact
erroneously placed before it by the court's instruction,
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then the error in th'e improper instruction would not be
prejudicial. The second determination was that where
an erroneous fact is placed before the jury by an instruction not supported by the evidenc·e, then where all
the other evidence in the case is sufficiently conelusive
so that the jury might have reached its verdict without
considering the facts 'erroneously placed before it, then,
although the instruction was erroneous, this court may
determine that the jury could not have been mislead by
the instruction and therefore the error would not be
pr'ejudicial. Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion in the
Clawson case was quoted extensively in appellants' brief.
The first of his "quotes" at the bottmn of page 21 of the
brief is applicable to the facts of this case.
Justice Wolfe's discussion and differentiation b'etween prejudicial and non-prejudicial inapplicable instructions does not apply to the case at hand for the
reason that clearly here, the matter was not prejudicial,
and, s'econd, it is clear in this case that the jury disregarded the instruction and did not rely on it in making
their determination.
In this case, the jury had before them the major and
this minor theory of defendants' case, the major theory
being that r'espondents had a right-of-way over the
drain in question, obtained by prescription. The minor
theory in question under this instruction, was that respondents had a right to be on the drain in question by
reason of agency through authority of Lester England.
Three special interrogatories were given to and
answered by the jury. The first one was :
"Do you find from the evidence that Weber
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County on November 20, 1953, had a right-of-way
across th'e plaintiffs' Hance A. Taylor, Erma C.
Taylor and Parley P. Taylor land for the purpose
of draining water through the drain then existing
on plaintiffs land and for cleaning and maintaining that water drain 1
"Answer yes or no"
The jury's answer: "Yes"
The second special interrogatory was:
"If you answered Special Interrogatory No. 1
yes, then do you find from tl1e evidence in this
case that Weber County on November 20, 1953,
enlarged said drain where it passes through the
land of the plaintiffs Hance A. Taylor, Erma C.
Taylor and Parley P. Taylor to a greater extent
than tlleir right-of-way allowed 1
"Answer yes or no"
The jury's answer: "No"
The third special interrogatory was not answered
for the reason that the prior answer had been no.
This clear and absolute determination by the jury
that W'eber County had a right-of-way of its own
through the drain and that the respondents did not exceed that right-of-way in their cleaning clearly establishes two things :
First, that since respondents had a right-of-way
of their own to do everything on the drain that they
did, tllen the question of whether or not they were there
also as agents of Lester England is immaterial, and since
they had such a right-of-way of their own, then Instruction No. 13, even though inapplicable and superfluous, would not be prejudicial to appellants.
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Second, that Instruction No. 13 may be disregarded
under th'e rule set forth in the Clawson vs. Walgreen
case above cited for the reason that it is clear in this
case that the jury in fact did disregard Instruction No.
13 concerning agency as it was not necessary in the
primary decision in the case.
Counsel's statement of the law concerning instructions, set out on page 20 of appellants' brief and taken
from 64 Corpus Juris 760 and 14 Ruling Case Law 736,
is a correct statement of law but does not completely
cover the question at hand. If appellants' statement is
taken in conjunction with a statement found in 5 Corpus
Juris Secundum at page 1118, the law applicable to this
point is then before the court:
"The giving of instructions which are abstract
or not authorized or applicable to the pleadings
and the evidence will not constitute a ground for
reversal where no prejudice results to the complaining party, and this is so whether or not the
instructions state correct rules of law."
The cases of Moore vs. Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co.,
174 P. 873, 52 Utah 373, and Daley vs. Salt Lake and
U. R. Co., 247 P. 293, 67 Utah 238, are cases supporting
respondents' argument on this point that when error is
made in instructing the jury, that error is harmless and
may be disregarded wher'e it is clear that the matter
is decided on another point. In 5 Corpus Juris Secundum at page 1144 it is stated:
"Giving an erroneous instruction is harmless
error where the verdict shows that the jury disregarded it."
Again from 5 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages
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1153 and 1154, under subsection (c) :
"Where sp'ecial findings by the jury or a finding
by them on one of a number of issues show that
appellant was not injured by an instruction,
errors therein will be deemed harmless."
This Point No. IV of appellants' brief should not
be sustained. It appears clear from the transcript that:
(1) The instruction here in question was sufficiently
supported by the evidence, and (2) In any event, the
appellants could not have be'en prejudiced thereby, and
any error would have been harmless as the jury clearly
disregarded it in reaching a verdict.
POINT NO. V.
Appellants' Contention that the Trial Court
Erred in His Refusal to Sustain the Objections
to the Testimony of Witness Lester England,
and Further Erred in Refusing Plaintiffs' Motion
to Strike the Testimony of Witness Lester
England as to Certain Matters
Respondents contend that the court properly refused to strike the testimony of witness Lester England.
The testimony of Mr. England with respect to the conversation with his father concerning his purchase of a
right-of-way through the drain in question (T. 187, 188,
189, 190, 191), meets the tests set out in Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. 5, Sec. 1563 - 1571, (3d Ed.), concerning
private boundaries:
1. The declarent was deceased at the time Lester
England testified concerning the conversation.
2. Tile declaration was made prior to any actual or
contemplated law suit concerning the drain.
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3. The declarent was standing on the drain and on
the land in question at the time he made the declaration.
4. The declarent had no apparent Inotive or interest
to misrepresent.
5. The declarent appeared to have had knowledge
of the boundaries of the drain in question.
The fact that the boundary here in question was one
bordering a right-of-way rather than around a field of
land should not make a difference as appellants' brief
. argues on page 26.
In the case of Rush vs. Collins, 366 Ill. 307, 8 N. E.
(2d) 659, at page 663 the court said:
"It is contended, however, that th'e court erred
in admitting in evidence conversations between
the plaintiff and others, who were not in title
to the Collins' property, and which conversations
w'ere out of the presence of and not acquiesced in
by the then owner of the Collins' property. Where
long possession is relied upon to establish the
right of a claimant to an easement, the same
strict rules of evidence are not required as where
a claim is founded on an ordinary title. The
most usual character of evidence in such a case
would be parol and not documentary. Conversations will be found in cases of this character,
either accompanying agre'ements or in explanation of conditions which existed, which aid or
tend to defeat the presumption, after twenty
years, of the right to use the property or way.
The evidence was competent for the limited purpose of showing the character of the plaintiff's
use of the alley, and there was no error in its
admission."
42
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The plaintiff testified that at the time he purchased
the property adjoining the tract of land over which he
claimed an easement he and the person from whom he
was purchasing made inquiry from the defendants' predecessor in interest concerning the alley in qu'estion and
the defendant's predecessor in interest replied, "we
made the all'ey years and years ago and you have been
using it ever since. There is no question about the
alley".
Also, see Morris on vs. Noone, 78 N. H. 338, 100 At.
45. The defendant claimed a right to flow the plaintiff's
land by virtue of a verbal agr'eement made in 1854 by
his father, his predecessor in title, with the owners of
land above the dam, at which time a letter "H" was cut
in a rock near the pond above the dam to mark the
height to which th'e parties agreed that Noone might
raise the water. Defendant also claimed a prescriptive
right to flow the plaintiff's land. The defendant, at
the trial, testified that his father told him that the mark
"H" was the point to which he had the right to raise
the water, and what Mr. Gallup, superintendent of the
mill, told him as to the placing of the mark upon the
rock. This testimony was objected to by the plaintiff.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court at page 46 of
Atlantic Reporter had this to say regarding this testimony:
"The defendant claimed by prescription, and the
statement that his father claimed that his right
was to raise the water to the mark "H" was
original evidence of the claim made by the defendant's ancestor in title. The evidence was
also admissable as the declaration as to the
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boundary of his real 'estate right by one now deceased having at the time the means of knowledge and no interest to misrepresent. 1,hough
Gallup was not an owner of the land, it was in
evidence that he was conn'ected with the mill for
several years as superintendent. It could be he
had the means of knowledge and was without
interest to misrepres'ent, and after his decea~r
his statements identifying the mark on the rock
as a monument bounding the right of flowage
were admissable."
However, even if we assum'e that the said testimony
of Lester England was inadmissable and incompetent,
then the following question must be answered: Was the
testimony prejudicial to the app'ellants ~
The law without any question is that the erroneous
admission of evidence is not reversible error unless it
is prejudicial. Schofield vs. Zion's Co-op Mercantile
Inst., 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 342; 96 A. L. R. 1083;
Knowlton vs. Thompson, 62 Utah 142, 218 P. 117; 3 Am.
Juris., Sec. 1027, page 576.
Also, where the verdict of the jury otherwise
renders immaterial, as regards the appellant, the issue
upon which alone such evidence was admitted and used,
the error is harmless.
The questioning of Letser England (T. 187-191)
concerning th'e conversation with his father was with
regard to his ownership and purchase from John A
Taylor of a right-of-way to the drain in question and
also the boundary of said right-of-way, and there was
no testimony or inference from Lester England or any
other witness that such right-of-way was transferred or
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desc'ended from his father to Weber County, as appellants agree on page 28.
As has previously been mentioned under Point No.
IV, defendants had a major and minor theory concerning their right to clean the drain in question, their
major theory b'eing that they had a right-of-way by
prescription, and their minor theory being that by reason
of agency through authority of Lester England, they
had a right to clean the drain. Through answering
"yes" to the first special interrogatory before set out,
the jury found that Weber County had a right-of-way
through the drain and that they did not exceed the
right-of-way in their cleaning thereof. Therefore, the
question of whether or not they were acting through th'e
agency of Lester England would be immaterial, and any
testimony of a right-of-way owned by Lester England
or his father would also be immaterial, and there could
b'e no prejudice to appellants as a result of said testimony.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Taylor drain is and has
since pioneer times been the natural course of drainage
for land lying to the north, east, and west. Weber
County, by prescription, has acquired a right-of-way
for drain purposes along this drain wher'e it runs
through the land of appellants. Landowners to the
north of appellants have acquired by purchase and con45
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tinned use the right to drain their water through thiE
drain. Respondents, in cleaning the drain, did not exceed their right-of-way and did no damage to appellant~'
land. The trial court properly exrercised its discretion
in giving its instructions and receiving evidence. The
appellants were in no way injured or prejudiced.
This court should therefor'e affirm the judgement
of the district court.
Respectfully sub1nitted,

MAURICE RICHARDS
MAXD. LAMPH

Attorneys for Respondents
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